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INTRODUCTION
In April of 2015, the same month that Freddie Gray suffered a
spinal injury and subsequently died in police custody in Baltimore,
Maryland,1 Damas Pakada, an Israeli Defense Forces (IDF) soldier
of Ethiopian descent, was brutally beaten by police officers.2 Like the
officers in the Freddie Gray case, the officer involved in the beating
of Pakada faced no jail time.3 Instead, the officer obtained a plea deal
and only received a reprimand and undisclosed fine.4
In 2019, another publicized shooting took place in America when
Atatiana Jefferson, a Black woman, was shot by a police officer in her
1. Rebecca R. Ruiz, Baltimore Officers Will Face No Federal Charges in Death of
Freddie Gray, N.Y. TIMES (Sept. 12, 2017), https://www.nytimes.com/2017/09/12/us/fred
die-gray-baltimore-police-federal-charges.html [https://perma.cc/YQK4-BJXH].
2. TOI Staff, Cops Beat Ethiopian IDF Soldier in Alleged Racist Attack, TIMES OF
ISR. (Apr. 27, 2015), https://www.timesofisrael.com/cops-beat-ethiopian-idf-soldier-in-al
leged-racist-attack [https://perma.cc/75W7-TG7A].
3. See Ruiz, supra note 1; Stuart Winer and Marissa Newman, Cop who beat
Ethiopian-Israeli soldier won’t be tried, TIMES OF ISR. (June 14, 2015), https://www.times
ofisrael.com/cop-who-beat-ethiopian-israeli-soldier-wont-be-tried [https://perma.cc
/E3BL-TDR7].
4. See Sue Surkes, Deal offered to cop accused of beating Ethiopian soldier, TIMES
OF ISR. (Mar. 20, 2017), https://www.timesofisrael.com/deal-offered-to-cop-accused-of-beat
ing-ethiopian-soldier [https://perma.cc/K7L8-XFNW].
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home in Fort Worth, Texas.5 The same year in Israel, there were two
publicized police shootings of Black individuals: Yehuda Biagda in
January and Solomon Teka in June.6 As of the publication of this
Note, neither the officer involved in Biagda’s death nor the one involved in Teka’s death has faced criminal liability.7
Tragically, in May of 2020, another publicized death of an unarmed Black man occurred—the killing of George Floyd.8 Officers
were called to the scene and, once they arrived, put Mr. Floyd in
handcuffs.9 Officer Derek Chauvin, the most senior officer at the
scene, pressed his knee into Mr. Floyd’s neck for more than eight
minutes, killing him.10 While Derek Chauvin has been charged with
second-degree murder, third-degree murder, and second-degree manslaughter, the beatings and killings of unarmed People of Color, especially Black people, has led to “Black Lives Matter” (BLM) protests
in the United States.11 Now, it seems that the BLM movement has
5. Marina Trahan Martinez, Nicholas Bogel-Burroughs & Sarah Mervosh, Fort Worth
Officer Charged With Murder for Shooting Woman in Her Home, N.Y. TIMES (Oct. 14,
2019), https://www.nytimes.com/2019/10/14/us/fort-worth-police-officer-charged-murder
.html [https://perma.cc/GBQ5-9BQC]; see also P.R. Lockhart, Fort Worth Officer Charged
With Murder in Killing of Black Woman in Her Own Home, VOX (Oct. 15, 2019), https://
www.vox.com/identities/2019/10/13/20912212/atatiana-jefferson-fort-worth-police-shoot
ing-texas-aaron-dean-murder.
6. Bar Peleg & Josh Breiner, Israel Police Close Case Against Cop Who Shot to
Death Mentally Ill Ethiopian Man, HAARETZ (May 8, 2019), https://www.haaretz.com
/israel-news/.premium-israel-police-close-case-against-cop-who-shot-to-death-mentally
-ill-ethiopian-man-1.7216256 [https://perma.cc/5CHN-UB6Z]; Noa Shpigel, Ido Efrati &
Josh Breiner, ‘We Didn’t Make Aliyah to Be Murdered’: Hundreds at Funeral of Ethiopian
Israeli Killed by Police, HAARETZ (July 02, 2019), https://www.haaretz.com/israel-news
/.premium-ethiopian-israeli-shot-dead-by-police-murdered-family-says-autopsy-incon
clusive-1.7429793 [https://perma.cc/RAC7-9V2N].
7. See Peleg & Breiner, supra note 6; Israeli Policeman Who Killed Black Teen
Released on Bail, AL JAZEERA (July 15, 2019), https://www.aljazeera.com/news/2019/07
/israeli-policeman-killed-black-teen-released-bail-190715150429939.html [https://perma
.cc/2LX2-SELJ].
8. See Evan Hill, Ainara Tiefelthäler, Cristiaan Triebert, Drew Jordan, Haley Williams
& Robin Stein, How George Floyd Was Killed in Police Custody, N.Y. TIMES (Aug. 31,
2020), https://www.nytimes.com/2020/05/31/us/george-floyd-investigation.html [https://
perma.cc/L7XR-FUAV] (occurring in Minneapolis, Minnesota).
9. See Holly Bailey, George Floyd Warned Police He Thought He Would Die Because
He Couldn’t Breathe, According to Body Camera Transcripts, WASH. POST (July 8, 2020),
https://www.washingtonpost.com/national/george-floyd-death-transcripts/2020 /07/08/a7
050efe-c15c-11ea-b178-bb7b05b94af1_story.html [https://perma.cc/WVA5-S5RP] (noting
that a convenience store clerk called the police because Floyd supposedly used a counterfeit twenty-dollar bill to buy cigarettes—a nonviolent offense).
10. Id. (noting that Derek Chauvin is a white male).
11. See Artemis Moshtaghian, Corrections Officers Say They Were Barred From Derek
Chauvin’s Floor Because of Their Skin Color, CNN (June 23, 2020), https://www.cnn
.com/2020/06/23/us/george-floyd-chauvin-detention-officers-discrimination/index.html
[https://perma.cc/ZWW6-UH3E] (noting that Derek Chauvin has been charged with
second-degree murder, third-degree murder, and second-degree manslaughter but has
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permeated Israel because of the rise in publicized killings of unarmed Black Ethiopian Jews.12
This Note will first discuss the presence of Ethiopian Jews in
Israel, and then compare their stature and rights (or lack thereof)
to another insular group in Israel—Arab Palestinians. Finally, this
Note will discuss possible solutions and remedies to these fatal
police shootings. Considering that the possibility of criminal liability
for officers is low,13 this Note will argue that both civil remedies and
additional training for police are necessary to avert future shootings
of Ethiopian Jews.
I. OVERVIEW OF THE ETHIOPIAN JEWISH PRESENCE IN ISRAEL
A. Who Are the Ethiopian Jewish Minority?
There is no one accepted history of the Ethiopian Jewish connection to Israel.14 Regardless, the community considers themselves
distinctly Jewish, despite having some apparent cultural and religious differences from the Ashkenazi Jewish majority in Israel.15
While in Ethiopia, this community called themselves “Falashas”
meaning “exiles and migrants,” since they felt as if they did not truly
belong in Ethiopia.16 The history of the Ethiopian Jews in Ethiopia
is one of violent persecution.17
not yet faced trial); BLACK LIVES MATTER, https://blacklivesmatter.com/ [https://perma
.cc/D3RZ-DD3U]; see also Adia Robinson, After 5 Years, Black Lives Matter inspires new
protest movements, ABC NEWS (July 21, 2018), https://abcnews.go.com/Politics/years
-black-lives-matter-inspires-protest-movements/story?id=56702439 [https://perma.cc
/JF52-NYAA].
12. David M. Halbfinger & Isabel Kershner, After a Police Shooting, Ethiopian
Israelis Seek a ‘Black Lives Matter’ Reckoning, N.Y. TIMES (July 13, 2019), https://www
.nytimes.com/2019/07/13/world/middleeast/ethiopian-israeli-protests-racism.html
[https://perma.cc/4HSL-KDPA].
13. See Peleg & Breiner, supra note 6; Israeli Policeman Who Killed Black Teen
Released on Bail, supra note 7.
14. See Katrina Homel, Note, Law and Production of Ethiopian Jews as “Other”:
Locating Alternative Discourses of Judaism in Israel’s Racial-Ethnic Hierarchy, 4 GEO.
J. L. & MOD. CRIT. RACE PERSP. 51, 52–53 (2012) (noting that some popular connections
relating to the relationship between King Solomon and the Queen of Sheba, hailing from
“Judaic converts or, alternatively, that they are the lost Tribe of Dan”).
15. Id. at 52–53 (explaining that some Ethiopian Jewish practices vary greatly from
teachings in the Torah and the Israeli Rabbinate, for example, separating women from
the general community during menstruation and after childbirth).
16. David D. Day, Comment, A New Conception of the Israeli Grundnorm: The Jewish
Immigration “Trump Card” as the Solution to the Falasha Mura Exception, 24 EMORY
INT’L L. REV. 357, 359 (2010) (internal quotation marks omitted).
17. Id. at 360 (describing that Ethiopian Jews faced persecution from the Ethiopian
government by having their tongues cut out, forced conversions, and death if they chose
not to convert).
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B. Escape to Israel from Religious Persecution in Ethiopia
Because of the continued persecution, the Ethiopian Jews felt the
need to escape Ethiopia and settle in Israel with their religious counterparts.18 There was public outcry in 1973 by Israeli Chief Rabbis
claiming it was the duty of the Israeli state to bring the Ethiopian
Jews to Israel because of the persecution they faced.19 In response
to persecution faced by the Ethiopian Jews and internal pressures,
the Israeli Government commenced Operation Moses in 1984 and
Operation Solomon in 1991, bringing a total of approximately 22,000
Ethiopian Jews to Israel.20
C. Settlement in a New Land
Even though Ethiopian Jews left Ethiopia because of religious
persecution, their settlement in Israel has proven less than ideal.21
For example, even before Operations Moses and Solomon, Ethiopian
Jews in Israel in 1977 were “compelled to undergo an immersion
ritual as well as declare their acceptance of rabbinic law” due to
their perceived “barbaric” nature.22 Since coming to this new land,
Ethiopians Jews have had their faith questioned both by rabbinical
institutions and individual rabbis claiming that the Ethiopian Jews’
connection to Judaism is too tenuous.23
To give the Israeli Government some credit, the introduction of
the Ethiopian Jews came with full state support, and, to some extent,
planning.24 The Israeli Government held the Ethiopian Jews in
“absorption centres for their first twelve to eighteen months.”25 The
objective of this program was the “gradual integration of Ethiopian
18. See id. at 361.
19. MICHÉLE LAMONT, GRAZIELLA MORAES SILVA, JESSICA S. WELBURN, JOSHUA
GUETZKOW, NISSIM MIZRACHI, HANNA HERZOG, & ELISA REIS, GETTING RESPECT: RESPONDING TO STIGMA AND DISCRIMINATION IN THE UNITED STATES, BRAZIL, AND ISRAEL
201 (2016).
20. See Day, supra note 16, at 361; see also Operation Moses: Israel’s Ethiopian
Community, ISR. MINISTRY OF FOREIGN AFFS. (Nov. 29, 2017), https://mfa.gov.il/MFA
/AboutIsrael/People/Pages/Operation-Moses-Israel%E2%80%99s-Ethiopian-commu
nity.aspx; Joel Brinkley, Ethiopian Jews and Israelis Exult as Airlift Is Completed, N.Y.
TIMES (May 26, 1991), https://www.nytimes.com/1991/05/26/world/ethiopian-jews-and-is
raelis-exult-as-airlift-is-completed.html?auth=link-dismiss-google1tap [https://perma.cc
/8DMM-YUTL].
21. Homel, supra note 14, at 57.
22. Id.
23. See Day, supra note 16, at 363–64.
24. GADI BENEZER, THE ETHIOPIAN JEWISH EXODUS: NARRATIVES OF THE JOURNEY TO
ISRAEL 1977–1985 184 (2002).
25. Id. (noting that a state-sponsored social worker was in charge of exposing the
Ethiopian Jews to Israeli culture).
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Jews into Israeli society.”26 Yet, even though the Israeli Government
had plans to successfully introduce the Ethiopian Jews into Israeli
society, the execution of these plans failed.27 The shortage of housing
led to the Ethiopian Jews remaining in the absorption centers, having
all of their needs provided by the government, which in turn led to
many Ethiopian Jews experiencing anxiety and unwillingness to
leave the absorption centers.28 Moreover, since the absorption centers were located within dilapidated apartment complexes in the
areas with the highest crime rates, the Israeli Government, whether
intentionally or not, segregated the Ethiopian Jews from Israeli
society.29 Lastly, because the Israeli Government placed the Ethiopian Jews in locations with not only high crime rates, but also high
unemployment rates, the vast majority of Ethiopian Jews could not
find any gainful employment.30
II. COMPARING PALESTINIANS AND ETHIOPIAN JEWS
In order to understand the plight of the Ethiopian Jews in Israel,
it may be helpful to compare their issues to a more prevalent minority
in Israel—the Palestinians.31 More specifically, their insular status,
views on the police or Israeli Defense Forces (IDF), and the application of the Rules of Engagement to each group.
A. Insular Groups in a “White” Society
Both Arab Palestinians and Ethiopian Jews face exclusion within
the Israeli state.32 Though both of these groups face discrimination
26. Id. (explaining that the specific objectives of the program included “learning the
new language, finding a permanent place to live and a proper job, and, most of all,
finding their way in Israeli culture and society.”).
27. See id.
28. See id. at 184–85.
29. See id. at 185.
30. See BENEZER, supra note 24, at 185 (noting that the Ethiopian Jews came from
largely agricultural backgrounds that the Israeli social safety nets did not account for);
Hanan Chehata, Israel: Promised Land for Jews . . . as Long as They’re not Black?, 53
RACE & CLASS 67, 70 (2012) (discussing how unemployment rates for Ethiopian Jews
hovered around seventy percent and about seventy-five percent of Ethiopian Jewish
families lived below the poverty line in 2012).
31. See Jeffrey Heller, Jews, Arabs nearing population parity in Holy Land: Israeli
officials, REUTERS (Mar. 26, 2018), https://www.reuters.com/article/us-israel-palestinians
-population/jews-arabs-nearing-population-parity-in-holy-land-israeli-officials-idUSK
BN1H222T [https://perma.cc/9BFU-4CBK] (noting there are an estimated five million
Palestinians in Gaza and the West Bank); The Ethiopian Population In Israel, ISR. CENT.
BUREAU OF STATS. (Nov. 5, 2018), https://www.cbs.gov.il/en/mediarelease/Pages/2018
/The-Ethiopian-Population-In-Israel.aspx [https://perma.cc/A34F-JWN9] (noting there
are 148,700 Israeli residents of Ethiopian origin).
32. See LAMONT ET AL., supra note 19, at 224.
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and ostracism, there are different mechanisms in place that cause
this discrimination.33 While Ethiopians face discrimination mainly
due to their skin color,34 or phenotype, the Arab Palestinians face
discrimination largely due to their nationality.35 The discrimination
faced by Arab Palestinians can also be connected, to a lesser extent,
to their religion when it is outwardly expressed, such as a niqab or
burqa for Muslim women or a kufi for Muslim men.36
According to some scholars, Arab Palestinians who are citizens
of the Israeli state face the “most exclusion” of Israelis not of Ashkenazi descent.37 The Arab Palestinians are phenotypically “similar to
the Jewish population, whose majority, the Mizrahim, similarly trace
their geographic origins to neighboring Arab states, such as Iraq,
Yemen, and Morocco.”38 Even though the Palestinians Arabs are
phenotypically similar to the Jewish Mizrahim and Ashkenazi majority, their exclusion can still be due to outwardly expressed factors.39
These factors include, but are not limited to, “speak[ing] Arabic in
public . . . Hebrew with an accent, or wear[ing] religious clothing.”40
The aforementioned discrimination is in reference to the Palestinian Arabs who hold Israeli citizenship.41 But, Palestinians Arabs
who live in the West Bank and Gaza Strip, and therefore do not hold
Israeli citizenship, also face discrimination for the same reasons as
their citizenship-holding counterparts.42 The types of discrimination
faced by the Arab Palestinians living in the West Bank and Gaza
Strip manifests in a different way than Arab Palestinians who hold
citizenship as well.43 Even though the Arab Palestinians who hold
citizenship fare better than their ethnic counterparts that do not
hold citizenship, they still face systemic discrimination because of
a lack of political representation and participation, segregation, and
social ostracization because of their perceived “untrustworthiness.”44
The non-citizen Arab Palestinians are discriminated against in
other ways. Unlike their citizenship-holding counterparts, the Arab
Palestinians in the West Bank and Gaza Strip face higher levels of
33. See id. at 13, 211.
34. See id. at 13, 25.
35. See id. at 25.
36. See id. at 196.
37. See id. at 194.
38. LAMONT ET AL., supra note 19, at 196.
39. See id.
40. Id.
41. See id. at 194.
42. See Emily Schaeffer Omer-Man, Extrajudicial Killings with Near Impunity: Excessive Force by Israeli Law Enforcement Against Palestinians, B.U.INT’L L.J. 115, 140 (2017).
43. See id.; see also LAMONT ET AL., supra note 19, at 197.
44. See LAMONT ET AL., supra note 19, at 197.
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police response and brutality.45 One similarity between the Arab
Palestinians, regardless of citizenship, is that they are not required
to serve in the Israeli Defense Force.46 Exempting Arab Palestinians
from military service may seem preferable to the minority since not
serving results in a smaller chance of bodily injury. In actuality,
lack of military conscription further excludes Arab Palestinians
from the greater Israeli population because military conscription
“serves as a crucial engine for social integration and the acquisition
of human, social, and symbolic capital.”47 In Israel, military conscription is mandatory for all Israeli Jews.48 The effect of exempting
Arab Palestinians from military service, then, further removes them
from social integration and accentuates their status as “others.”49
Furthermore, the perceived lack of patriotism gives the Arab Palestinians an image of “untrustworthiness” and disloyalty by their fellow citizens.50
The Ethiopian Jewish minority faces similar struggles to the
Arab Palestinians, but they differ in two major ways.51 First, the
“stigma of blackness” is compounded with racist beliefs that disadvantage the Ethiopian Jews in markedly different ways than Arab
Palestinians.52 While Arab Palestinians are seen as “untrustworthy”
and disloyal,53 the stigma around Ethiopian Jews manifests through
perceptions of “cultural backwardness . . . and doubts over the authenticity of their Jewishness.”54 Even though some religious authorities
claimed that the Ethiopian Jews were obviously Jewish, making
their inclusion under the Law of Return more feasible, the Chief
Rabbinate’s uncertainty and calls for symbolic conversion questioned
their status under the Law of Return.55 Second, Ethiopian Jews face
45. See Omer-Man, supra note 42, at 140–41.
46. LAMONT ET AL., supra note 19, at 195.
47. Id. at 197.
48. See id. at 195.
49. See id. at 195, 197.
50. See id. at 197.
51. See id. at 25.
52. See LAMONT ET AL., supra note 19, at 201; see also BENEZER, supra note 24, at
185–86 (noting that the Ethiopian Jews were referred to as “cushi,” meaning black or
slave, by the Israeli Mizrahim); Chehata, supra note 30, at 71 (discussing instances of
overt racism towards Ethiopian Jews, such as bus drivers refusing to accept them as
passengers and Israeli Mizrahim “becoming hostile” when arrested by an Ethiopian
Jewish IDF soldier).
53. LAMONT ET AL., supra note 19, at 197 (internal quotations omitted).
54. Id. at 201; see also BENEZER, supra note 24, at 186 (explaining that, since Israel
is a “highly security-conscious society,” the Ethiopian Jews were both feared and seen
as untrustworthy until the mid to late 1990s).
55. See BENEZER, supra note 24, at 189; see also The Law of Return, 5710-1950, LSI 4
114, https://www.knesset.gov.il/laws/special/eng/return.htm [https://perma.cc/W62C-F3FJ].
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exclusion due to their status as recent immigrants to Israel.56 Somewhat similar to the Arab Palestinians who speak Hebrew with a distinguishable accent,57 Ethiopian Israelis face exclusion and ridicule
for a “lack of fluency in Hebrew.”58 Even though the recent immigration status of Ethiopian Jews has led to exclusion and ostracization,
the Israeli state has taken active efforts to assimilate Ethiopian
Jews through unofficial programs that are specifically “designed to
‘whiten’” them.59 These programs include immigration officials urging
Ethiopian Jewish parents to rename their children to more traditional Jewish and Ashkenazi names, having immigration officials
change their names without choice, taking Ethiopian youths to Europe
in order to “undergo European acculturation,” and forced stays in
“absorption centres” until they were sufficiently whitened.60
Unlike Arab Palestinians, Ethiopian Jews have better chances
of inclusion since they are conscripted into the military due to their
faith.61 Yet, these bare efforts of inclusion do not seem to be enough,
considering “their desertion rate is the highest among all groups
enlisted . . . .”62
B. Views on the Police
Ethiopian Jews face issues of both over-policing and underpolicing within their communities.63 Over-policing is an issue that disproportionately affects minorities through “excessive use of force . . .
or by discriminatory practices.”64 An example of over-policing is
when the police are called to break up heated arguments between
Ethiopian Israelis, but escalate tensions by beating those involved,
bystanders, and “arrest[ing] people on false pretenses . . . .”65 The
issue of racial policing and profiling can arise from “the use of
56. LAMONT ET AL., supra note 19, at 201; see also BENEZER, supra note 24, at 189
(“Instead of acquiring an image as being a brave and resourceful people, [the Ethiopian
Jews] were (and still are) viewed by Israelis as helpless/dependent/resourceless people
who were saved from starvation by the Israelis.”); Operation Moses: Israel’s Ethiopian
Community, supra note 20; Brinkley, supra note 20.
57. LAMONT ET AL., supra note 19, at 196.
58. Id. at 201.
59. Id. at 202.
60. See id.; Uri Ben-Elizer, Becoming a Black Jew: Cultural Racism and Anti-Racism
in Contemporary Israel, 10 SOC. IDENTITIES 245, 250–51 (2004).
61. See LAMONT ET AL., supra note 19, at 203.
62. Id.
63. Ofir Abu, Fany Yuval & Guy Ben-Porat, Race, Racism, and Policing: Responses of
Ethiopian Jews in Israel to Stigmatization by the Police, 17 ETHNICITIES 688, 692 (2017).
64. Id.
65. Id. at 698.
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generalizations based on race, ethnicity, religion or national affiliation
as the basis for suspicion in directing law enforcement actions . . . .”66
Some argue that the dialogue painting Ethiopian Jews as deserters
or “culturally backward . . . [and] violent” fuels the over-policing of
the community.67 The Ethiopian Jewish minority may be more prone
to over-policing because of their apparent blackness and the stigmas
surrounding it.68
Under-policing, on the other hand, constitutes neglect and slow
response times that disproportionately affects minority communities.69
Some scholars’ studies assert that Ethiopians “prefer under-policing
out of fear of over-policing.”70 The general view of Ethiopians who
live in segregated communities is that the police turn a blind eye to
their neighborhoods.71 According to Ethiopian Jews living in their
insular communities, police officers, when forced to respond to issues in the Ethiopian Jewish ghettos, “only end up worsening the
situation[s].”72
Thus, the issues of over-policing and under-policing compound
to excessively affect the Ethiopian Jewish minority.73 This is especially apparent with the police killing of Yehuda Biagda.74 Before the
incident that led to Biagda’s arrest, his family called the police multiple times to inform them of his mental instability and propensity to
hurt himself or others.75 Although the police admitted that they fielded
multiple calls from Biagda’s family, they did nothing to alleviate the
situation.76 Furthermore, when Biagda’s mental health deteriorated
to the point where he obtained a knife and started threatening others,
the police took nearly an hour to respond.77 Moving from under-policing to over-policing, the police response to Biagda escalated incredibly
quickly.78 Instead of de-escalating the situation, the police responded
with aggression and gunned down Biagda with little hesitation.79
66. Id. at 692.
67. See id.; LAMONT ET AL., supra note 19, at 231.
68. See Abu et al., supra note 63, at 692, 695.
69. Id. at 692.
70. Id. at 698.
71. See id.
72. Id.
73. See id. at 692.
74. See Peleg & Breiner, supra note 6.
75. See Josh Breiner & Bar Peleg, Israeli Police Who Shot 24-Year-Old Told He Was
Mentally Unstable, Senior Official Says, HAARETZ (Jan. 21, 2019), https://www.haaretz
.com/israel-news/.premium-israeli-police-who-shot-24-year-old-told-he-was-mentally-un
stable-official-says-1.6854545 [http://perma.cc/N6FD-DPAJ].
76. See id.
77. See id.
78. See Abu et al., supra note 63, at 692; Breiner & Peleg, supra note 75.
79. See Peleg & Breiner, supra note 6.
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The beating of Damas Pakada and the shooting of Solomon Teka
are other examples of the under- and over-policing issues plaguing the
Ethiopian Jewish minority.80 The attack on Pakada, who was an active
IDF soldier at the time, exhibited telltale signs of over-policing.81
Pakada rode his bicycle past two police officers and asked them what
they were doing.82 In response to this innocent inquiry, the police
officers heightened tensions by pushing Pakada off of his bike while
yelling that they could do whatever they wanted.83 Escalating this
tension further, the officers explicitly threatened to shoot Pakada in
the head.84 All of this culminated in Pakada being beaten and
detained—all for asking a simple question.85
Although there are conflicting reports regarding Solomon Teka’s
death, there is a strong inference that an off duty police officer
escalated the situation.86 Teka, eighteen at the time, had previous
interactions with law enforcement, but there are implications that—
because of his large size and stature—the interactions were excessively violent on the part of the police.87 The inference from Teka’s
prior interactions with police, which led to an escalation of tensions
and violence, is that his community is plagued by over-policing.88
Support for a conclusion of over-policing in the case of Teka comes
in the form of eyewitness accounts.89 According to some eyewitnesses, Teka “was at least 30 meters away from [the off-duty officer].”90
Since Teka was so far away from the off-duty officer, there is no
reason he should have posed a threat—especially since he was
unarmed.91 Since there was no perceivable threat, it is confounding
as to why the off-duty officer would escalate the situation unless one
concludes that he imputed to Teka negative stereotypes relating to
80. See TOI Staff, supra note 2; Shpigel et al., supra note 6; Abu et al., supra note 63,
at 698.
81. See TOI Staff, supra note 2; Abu et al., supra note 63, at 692.
82. TOI Staff, supra note 2.
83. Id.
84. Id.
85. Id.
86. See Shpigel et al., supra note 6.
87. See id.
88. See id.; Abu et al., supra note 63, at 692.
89. See Shpigel et al., supra note 6.
90. See id. (internal quotation marks omitted).
91. See Josh Breiner, Cop who killed Ethiopian Israeli teen justifies not shooting in
the air, HAARETZ (July 4, 2019), https://www.haaretz.com/israel-news/.premium-cop-who
-killed-ethiopian-israeli-teen-explains-why-he-didn-t-shoot-in-the-air-1.7438434 [https://
perma.cc/8M39-H4PG]; see also Noa Shpigel & Josh Breiner, Off-duty police officer shoots
dead Ethiopian Israeli teen in northern Israel, HAARETZ (July 1, 2019), https://www
.haaretz.com/israel-news/.premium-ethiopian-israeli-teen-shot-to-death-by-off-duty-po
lice-officer-in-northern-israel-1.7425166 [https://perma.cc/R2CT-QYHD].
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Ethiopian Jews.92 The societal view of Ethiopian Jews being violent
may inform the decisions that police officers make when they decide
to escalate, rather than de-escalate, tensions.93 Lastly, there are
signs of under-policing arising from the circumstances surrounding
Teka’s shooting as well.94 Teka’s family members expressed an inherent feeling of insecurity when Ethiopian Jews are in close proximity to police officers.95
Palestinian Arabs, on the other hand, face issues of over-policing
much more than under-policing.96 This is mostly seen when going
through security checkpoints guarded by IDF soldiers.97 Generally,
Arab Palestinians are “singled out” when going through security
checkpoints and “unfairly marked as a potential enemy.”98 Similar
to the Ethiopian Jewish Minority, the general Ashkenazi Israeli
society view Arab Palestinians as a violent and dangerous group.99
However, the stereotype that Arab Palestinians are violent is more
pronounced than the stereotype that Ethiopian Jews are violent.100
The deeper stereotype of Arab Palestinian aggression leads to overpolicing manifesting through public pat downs, verbal abuse, public
undressing, and IDF soldiers brandishing assault weapons at them.101
The negative interactions with police and IDF soldiers also manifests in ways that are not physical in nature.102
Overall, both Ethiopian Jews and Arab Palestinians are overpoliced, partly because of negative stereotypes about each ethnic
92. See Breiner, supra note 91; Shpigel & Breiner, supra note 91; Abu et al., supra
note 63, at 692.
93. See Abu et al., supra note 63, at 692.
94. See id. at 698; Shpigel et al., supra note 6.
95. See Shpigel et al., supra note 6.
96. See LAMONT ET AL., supra note 19, at 237 (explaining that the Palestinian Arabs
are forced into humiliating acts by Israeli Police and the IDF).
97. See id.
98. Id.
99. See id.; Abu et al., supra note 63, at 692 (explaining that minorities are overpoliced because of stigmas).
100. See LAMONT ET AL., supra note 19, at 237 (noting that Arab Palestinians face
surprisingly rapid escalations of violence in unwarranted scenarios); Abu et al., supra
note 63, at 693 (discussing that Israeli officials are surprised when Ethiopian Jews turn
to violent protest since they are normally seen as a “quiet and retiring community”)
(internal quotation marks omitted).
101. See LAMONT ET AL., supra note 19, at 237.
102. See id. at 2–3 (describing the experience of a group of Arab Palestinians who were
kept waiting for a long period of time at a security checkpoint, an IDF soldier pretended
to return their identification cards to Arab Palestinians, and the Arab Palestinians were
forced to forcibly pull their identification cards from IDF soldier who would not release
his grip); see also Chehata, supra note 30, at 74–75 (recounting an instance where an
Ethiopian soldier enlisted in the IDF committed suicide after being called a “kushi”—a
derogatory term for “black” in Hebrew—by Mizrahim soldiers every single day).
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group.103 Ethiopian Jews, though, face a unique stigma since their
communities face blatant apathy from Israeli police due to a combination of the lack of infrastructure and segregation based on race
even though they share the faith of the ruling class.104 This stigma
and unfair treatment is also experienced at higher levels in Ethiopian
Jewish communities than “veteran” Israelis.105
C. The Rules of Engagement
The Rules of Engagement for Israeli police and the IDF are
codified in the Suspect Arrest Procedure.106 The Suspect Arrest
Procedure is classified and only pieces of it are uncovered during the
discovery phase of Israeli cases where it is an issue.107 Included in the
Suspect Arrest Procedure is the escalation of force the Israeli government has deemed appropriate when IDF soldiers and police officers
are faced with someone who is
clearly suspected of attempting, committing, or assisting in the
commission of a “serious offense” (including murder or attempted
murder, a “terror attack” on persons or property, possession of
an illegal method, active membership in a hostile organization,
or throwing stones at a vehicle or person in a life-threatening
way) . . . .108

The escalation of force under the Suspect Arrest Procedure is as
follows: “[(1)] calling out to the suspect . . . [(2)] cocking the soldier’s
weapon; [(3)] shooting in the air; [(4)] shooting at the legs to incapacitate; and [(5)] finally, if the suspect still poses a threat, shooting
at the chest to injure or kill.”109
The Suspect Arrest Procedure is applied in an uneven fashion
between Israelis and Palestinians due to the national origin of the
Arab Palestinian people.110 While the Suspect Arrest Procedure is
meant to be applied without reference to any specific ethnic group,
103. See Abu et al., supra note 63, at 695; LAMONT ET AL., supra note 19, at 234–35, 237.
104. See Abu et al., supra note 63, at 698–99 (describing the Ethiopian Jewish
minority as “[s]ocially, economically, and politically powerless . . . [and] also distinct due
to their dark skin color”).
105. See id. at 695–99 (explaining that veteran Israelis—those Israelis hailing from
Europe—have less interactions with the police, do not fear the police as much as their
Ethiopian counterparts, and have more trust and faith in the police overall).
106. See Omer-Man, supra note 42, at 131–32.
107. Id. at 132 n.67.
108. See id. at 131–32.
109. Id. at 131–32.
110. See id. at 140–41.
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there is ample evidence that the Suspect Arrest Procedure is discriminatorily applied towards Arab Palestinians, leading to unnecessary
deaths that would most likely not occur with Mizrahim suspects.111
There are unwritten rules and understandings in enforcing the
Suspect Arrest Procedure that lead to police shootings that disproportionately affect Arab Palestinians as compared with Israelis.112
In reality, “soldiers are trained not to escalate the [Suspect Arrest
Procedure] beyond the firing of a warning shot [with Israelis].”113
Additionally, there is a common understanding amongst the Jewish
population, IDF soldiers, and Israeli police that “the idea that police
and soldiers would use live ammunition against the Jewish population . . . is inconceivable.”114 When policing the Arab Palestinians,
the Israeli police and IDF, who are state actors, escalate the use of
force hastily, which “far exceeds what is necessary to maintain safety
and order.”115
This disparate treatment in policing is further reinforced by
public perception.116 The problem is exacerbated because “nearly
half of the Jewish population in Israel, which comprises 80% of the
Israeli population . . . support a ‘shoot-to-kill’ policy in handling suspected Palestinian assailants, ‘even if [they have] been apprehended
and clearly [do] not [pose] a threat.’”117 This is not solely an issue of
the general Israeli population.118 When members of the Israeli government share views similar to the general Israeli population—
allowing soldiers to act as judge, jury, and executioner in the
streets—there is little recourse available for Arab Palestinians to
turn towards besides the judicial system after a family member or
friend is gunned down.119
111. See, e.g., id. at 139–40 (explaining that when protestors only hold a rock or simply
throw one rock, while showing no intent to throw another, it is impermissible to escalate
to steps three or four in the Suspect Arrest Procedure, even though IDF soldiers and
Israeli police have done so in the past).
112. See id. at 142–43.
113. Id. at 140.
114. Id. at 141 (emphasis added).
115. Id. at 143.
116. See id. at 134; see supra Sections III.A–B.
117. Omer-Man, supra note 42, at 134 (brackets in original).
118. See id.
119. See id. at 134–35; see also Yonah Jeremy Bob, Israeli officials to Blame for Hebron
shooting, says Human Rights Watch. NGO says Incident due to Encouragement of ‘Shootto-Kill’ Policy, JERUSALEM POST (Jan. 3, 2017), https://www.jpost.com/Israel-News/Israeli
-officials-to-blame-for-Hebron-shooting-says-Human-Rights-Watch-477290 [https://
perma.cc/E7RL-7D6C] (statement of Public Security Minister Gildan Erdan) (“[I]f a
terrorist has a knife or screwdriver in his hand, you should shoot to kill him without
thinking twice”); Herb Keinon, Jerusalem Post Staff & Anna Ahronheim, Ethiopian
Israelis Continue Protests As Family Of Victim Calls For Calm, JERUSALEM POST (July 3,
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Even though it is “inconceivable” to think that the Suspect Arrest
Procedure would be applied in an aggressive way towards the Jewish
population, it is starting to affect the Ethiopian Jewish population
in ways similar to the Arab Palestinians.120 The Suspect Arrest Procedure does not directly apply to the case of Damas Pakada since he
was beaten by police officers and not shot.121 The same cannot be
said of the instances surrounding the shootings of Yehuda Biadga
and Solomon Teka.
In Biagda’s case, the circumstances show that the police were
put on notice that he was mentally ill—suffering from PTSD and
other undiagnosed mental issues that arose from his military service.122 The police were called for Biagda’s safety but when they
arrived at the scene, an hour after the initial call, Biadga ran at the
police while brandishing a knife.123 It does not appear that the officer
followed the Suspect Arrest Procedure.124 Instead of trying to shoot
to incapacitate, the officer shot to kill.125 This was in violation of the
Suspect Arrest Procedure and shows how, even though Biadga was
Jewish, there is an inconsistency in application of Suspect Arrest
Procedure to those who do not look stereotypically Israeli.126 As
stated above, there is a common notion that the Suspect Arrest Procedure will not escalate past warning shots when the suspect is
Jewish, yet there seems to be a disconnect since Biagda, who was
Jewish, was shot.127
2019), https://www.jpost.com/israel-news/netanyahu-on-ethiopian-israeli-protests-we-will
-not-tolerate-violence-594482 [https://perma.cc/46T9-XBBW] (describing Prime Minister
Netanyahu’s statement on Ethiopian protestors where he “demand[ed]” that the protestors
abide by the rule of law); Tamar Beeri, Gilad Erdan: We Will Fight for Right to Protest,
Will Not Tolerate Anarchy, JERUSALEM POST (July 2, 2019), https://www.jpost.com/Israel
-News/Gilad-Erdan-We-will-fight-for-right-to-protest-will-not-tolerate-anarchy-594434
[https://perma.cc/5WPB-A7QK] (stating that Erdan said the Israeli government “will not
tolerate anarchy” when speaking about Ethiopian protests); Jerusalem Post Staff, Police
chief defends cop who killed Solomon Tekah, JERUSALEM POST (July 9, 2019), https://
www.jpost.com/Israel-News/Police-commissioner-defends-off-duty-cop-who-killed-Ethio
pian-teen-595076 [https://perma.cc/WRS5-AKF5] (discussing comments made by Police
Commissioner Motti Cohen who defended the shooting of Solomon Teka and said that
he would “not allow [his] policemen to be injured”).
120. See Omer-Man, supra note 42, at 139–41; Breiner & Peleg, supra note 75.
121. See Telem Yahav, Case against policeman who beat Ethiopian soldier closed,
YNET NEWS (Feb. 28, 2018), https://www.ynetnews.com/articles/0,7340,L-5137184,00
.html [https://perma.cc/8TDX-KKRD]; see also Omer-Man, supra note 42, at 131–32.
122. See Breiner & Peleg, supra note 75.
123. See id.; Peleg & Breiner, supra note 6.
124. See Breiner & Peleg, supra note 75 (discussing that three bystanders described
the situation differently, but all agreed that the officer went directly from a verbal
warning to utilizing lethal force).
125. See id.; Omer-Man, supra note 42, at 131–32.
126. See Omer-Man, supra note 42, at 131–32; LAMONT ET AL., supra note 19, at 201–03.
127. See Omer-Man, supra note 42, at 141; Breiner & Peleg, supra note 75.
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At the time of this Note, Teka is the most recent Ethiopian Jewish
victim of a police shooting and, like in Biagda’s case, the specific facts
underlying the shooting are hotly contested.128 The off-duty officer
claimed that Teka attacked a 13-year-old and, after the officer identified himself, threw rocks at the officer and his family.129 The officer
suggested that he was hit by a rock and responded by shooting his
gun at the ground, where the bullet ricocheted and struck Teka,
killing him.130 Eyewitness accounts say that it was unreasonable for
the officer to fear for his life since Teka was “30 meters away,” and
the officer was “aiming straight at [Teka].”131 It is hard to explain
how the officer could have complied with steps three and four of the
Suspect Arrest Procedure if eyewitness accounts claim that the officer aimed directly at Teka’s chest instead of shooting in the air or
at Teka’s legs as the Procedure prescribes.132 Moreover, others
questioned why the officer decided to shoot Teka dead rather than
firing in the air.133 These comments imply that the general Israeli
population knows that the officer escalated tensions further than
standard procedure requires.134
Teka’s case is yet another one where Israeli police, who are state
actors, are seemingly not complying with the Suspect Arrest Procedure specifically against the Ethiopian Jewish minority.135 It is thus
apparent that the Suspect Arrest Procedure is not only discriminatorily applied to the Arab Palestinians, but also to the Ethiopian
Jewish minority as well.136
III. POSSIBLE REMEDIES
Although people like Yehuda Biagda and Solomon Teka are dead,
the justice system should not fail those who survive them. Considering that the police officer who killed Teka was only under house
arrest and has yet to be charged,137 and the case against the officer
128. See Breiner, supra note 91; Shpigel & Breiner, supra note 91.
129. Breiner, supra note 91.
130. Id.
131. Id.
132. See Omer-Man, supra note 42, at 131–32; Breiner, supra note 91 (mentioning
that, according to internal investigators, the officer who killed Teka had “significant
gaps” in his story).
133. Breiner, supra note 91.
134. See Omer-Man, supra note 42, at 131–32; see also Breiner, supra note 91.
135. See Breiner, supra note 91; LAMONT ET AL., supra note 19, at 201–03; see also
Omer-Man, supra note 42, at 131–32.
136. See Keinon et al., supra note 119.
137. See Aaron Rabinowitz, Almog Ben Zikri, Bar Peleg, Noa Shpigel & Josh Breiner,
Cop who shot Ethiopian Israeli teen faces reduced charge; protests continue, HAARETZ
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who killed Biagda closed with no finding of criminal liability,138 there
needs to be another avenue for recourse. There are possible remedies that the surviving members of fatal police shootings can pursue,
each with their own benefit and shortcomings.
A. Private Tort Remedies
The Israeli State can be found liable in civil suits for both intentional torts and negligence under Israel’s Civil Wrongs Law.139
Although many Arab Palestinians attempt to utilize the Civil Wrongs
Law to sue Israel, the efforts have been largely unsuccessful.140 The
Civil Wrongs Law excludes Israel from liability if an injury or death
arises from a “Combat Action.”141 Because the Knesset did not define
the term “Combat Action” when promulgating the Civil Wrongs
Law, the Israeli courts were left to construe the phrase, leading to
both broad and restrictive interpretations.142 In 2002, the Knesset
amended the law to define “Combat Action immunity to include any
action conducted to combat terrorism . . . and any action whose
stated aim is to prevent terrorism, hostile actions, or insurrection
committed in circumstances of danger to life or limb.”143
Furthermore, Palestinians in the Gaza Strip seem out of luck
both because they live in an “enemy territory” and have to make a
bond payment to commence litigation.144 Even though the bond
payment is traditionally applied to foreigners, it has become common to mandate bonds for Palestinians living in the Gaza Strip and
West Bank.145 Since most Palestinians cannot pay these staggering
expenses, their claims are usually dismissed, or, if they are lucky,
suspended until they can obtain the necessary funds.146 To put the
bond payments into perspective, they can range from $5,200 USD
(July 15, 2019), https://www.haaretz.com/israel-news/.premium-cop-who-shot-ethiopian
-israeli-to-be-charged-with-reckless-homicide-1.7527693 [https://perma.cc/E55N-VV4F].
138. Breiner & Peleg, supra note 75.
139. §§ 2–3 Civil Wrongs (Liability of the State) Law, 5712-1952, LSI 6 147, as amended,
https://www.adalah.org/uploads/oldfiles/features/compensation/law-e.pdf.
140. See Gilat J. Bachar, Access Denied—Using Procedure to Restrict Tort Litigation:
The Israeli-Palestinian Experience, 92 CHI.-KENT L. REV. 841, 845–46 (2017).
141. See id. at 847
142. See id.
143. Id. (internal quotation marks omitted).
144. See id. at 849–50 (noting that even though Arab Palestinians have a much lower
standard of living than Jewish Israelis, the Israeli courts mandate bonds ranging from
$5,200 to $400,000 in order to commence civil proceedings).
145. Id. at 849.
146. See id. at 850.
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on the low end to, as high as, $400,000 USD.147 It is absurd to think
that Palestinian family members could pay this bond when, as of
2017, the GDP per capita of Palestinians in the West Bank was a
mere $3,199.00 USD.148
The default Israeli civil procedure rule, on the other hand,
makes it clear that bonds are not a requirement because they inherently “hinder plaintiffs’ access to justice.”149 The reason the Palestinians are being subject to the bonds that foreign plaintiffs are
normally subjected to is because the Israeli courts treat the Palestinians as foreigners.150
Ethiopian Jews, on the other hand, would not have to worry
about the exception placed upon the Palestinians.151 Since Palestinians reside in the West Bank and Gaza Strip (occupied territories)
and have the ability to bring claims against the State in Israeli or
Palestinian courts, it is easy to see how Israel can apply the bond
exception to Palestinians.152 Ethiopian Jews do not reside in the West
Bank or Gaza Strip, nor are they Palestinian, meaning that they
cannot bring their claims in either Israeli or Palestinian courts.153
Ethiopian Israelis are precluded from bringing claims in Israeli
courts and thus cannot be treated as foreign plaintiffs.154 The courts
need look no further than the Law of Return.155
That being said, it is apparent why the claims of foreignness
and lack of faith put the Ethiopian Jews in a precarious position.
Without a strong claim to Israeli citizenship, they could fall within
the foreign plaintiff exception.156 This revocation of rights would be
absolutely devastating to the Ethiopian Jews. If the Ethiopian Jews
are officially relegated to a position where they are considered
foreign plaintiffs, this proposed remedy to unjust killings would be
147. See id.
148. West Bank and Gaza—GDP Per Capita, INDEX MUNDI, https://www.indexmundi
.com/facts/west-bank-and-gaza/gdp-per-capita [https://perma.cc/S4J6-BDNM] (noting
that the statistics were gathered from the World Bank and the Organisation for Economic
Co-operation and Development).
149. Bachar, supra note 140, at 849.
150. Id.
151. See § 1, The Law of Return, 5710-1950, LSI 4 114; Bachar, supra note 140, at
847–48.
152. See Bachar, supra note 140, at 849–50.
153. See TESHOME G. WAGAW, FOR OUR SOUL: ETHIOPIAN JEWS IN ISRAEL 94–95 (1993);
see also Bachar, supra note 140, at 849–50.
154. See § 4, The Law of Return, 5710-1950, LSI 4 114; Bachar, supra note 140, at
847–48.
155. See § 4, The Law of Return, 5710-1950, LSI 4 114.
156. See id.; cf. Bachar, supra note 140, at 848; Day, supra note 16, at 363–64 (describing prominent Israeli politicians questioning the faith of Ethiopian Jews, their only
connection to the Law of Return).
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moot.157 Considering the similar situation Palestinians are in—
where IDF soldiers kill them and courts are unpersuaded that the
plaintiffs will succeed in their case—Ethiopian Jews would be further
deterred from bringing private tort claims against the State.158
The Civil Wrongs Law states, in pertinent part, “[t]he State is
not civilly liable for an act done within the scope of lawful authority,
or bona fide in the purported exercise of lawful authority; but it is
liable for negligence in connection with such an act.”159 Considering
that the Combat Action immunity has only been amended and construed against the Palestinians, and that the Israeli High Court of
Justice found that parts of the Combat Action exemptions were too
broad when first enacted, it is likely that Ethiopian Jews can still
claim protection under the Civil Wrongs Law.160 If Ethiopian Jews
bring civil tort claims for killings similar to Teka’s, it is unlikely that
Israeli courts will find that the actions prevented fall within the
terrorism exceptions under the statute.161 If anything, the most worrisome provision for Ethiopian Jews is the Combat Action immunity
for “any action conducted to combat . . . hostile actions” because
there is no case law interpreting what a “hostile action” is.162 As of
now, the most significant hurdles that pose a threat to Ethiopian Jews
when they seek justice for those killed by police are procedural.163
B. Adopting Foreign Remedies and Procedures
A proposed solution in many countries when there is a rise of
police shootings is usually disarming the police.164 Realistically, this
will not be a viable option for Israel because of the region’s heightened security risks in the region.165 Another possibility is the adoption
of the policies in place across Norway and Finland, which require that
an officer “obtain[s] permission from a superior officer, whenever
157. Cf. Bachar, supra note 140, at 841.
158. See id. (noting that most cases requiring bond payments never reach the merits);
cf. Chehata, supra note 30, at 70 (explaining that most Ethiopian Jews are destitute,
suggesting that they would be unsuccessful in litigating a claim against the State).
159. § 3 Civil Wrongs (Liability of the State) Law, 5712-1952, LSI 6 147, as amended
(emphasis in original).
160. See Bachar, supra note 140, at 848 n.50 (explaining that the Israeli High Court
found that “sweeping exemption[s]” in the 2005 Amendment excessively limited the
Palestinian’s rights to seek legal recourse).
161. See id. (citing HCJ 8276/05 Abdalah v. Gov’t of Isr. 62(1) PD 352, 373 (2006) (Isr.)).
162. See id. at 847.
163. Cf. at 849.
164. See, e.g., D.D. Guttenplan, It’s Time to Disarm the Police, THE NATION (June 25,
2020), https://www.thenation.com/article/society/disarm-police-nypd-slavery/ [https://
perma.cc/W4EY-97MZ].
165. See BENEZER, supra note 24, at 186.
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possible, before shooting anyone.”166 However, it is hard to see how
Norway and Finland’s policies would be effective in situations similar
to Yehuda Biagda where, even though the suspect is suffering from
mental impairments, they are charging at the police with a weapon.167
It may also be unrealistic to have the police obtain permission
to shoot a suspect in situations similar to Solomon Teka’s where there
is a struggle, the suspect is running away from the police officer, and
the police officer claims to have been acting in self-defense and in the
heat of the moment.168 Realistically, because Israel has the Suspect
Arrest Procedure in place with specified steps on how to escalate force,
the implementation of a supervisor’s permission to execute the final
step of lethal force seems unnecessary if the Suspect Arrest Procedure
is strictly followed.169
In countries like Ukraine, there are specified remedies that
private citizens can pursue when there has been misconduct by the
police.170 In particular, there is a remedy that private citizens can
seek when the police inflict not just physical damage, but moral damage as well.171 Article 23 of Ukraine’s Civil Code says that moral
damage can consist of:
1.

2.

3.

4.

physical pain and misery suffered by a natural person
in connection with his/her disability or other health
impairment;
soul sufferings incurred by a natural person in connection with the illegal conduct of his/her family or close
relatives;
soul sufferings incurred by a natural person in connection with the destruction or damaging of his/her property;
abasement of honor and dignity of an individual as well
as business standing of an individual or a legal entity.172

166. Paul Hirshfield, Why Do American Cops Kill More People Than in Other Countries?, NEWSWEEK (Nov. 29, 2015), https://theconversation.com/why-do-american-cops-kill
-so-many-compared-to-european-cops-49696 [https://perma.cc/WL5D-XL53].
167. See id.; Peleg & Breiner, supra note 6.
168. See Breiner, supra note 91.
169. See Omer-Man, supra note 42, at 131–32; Hirshfield, supra note 166; cf. LAMONT
ET AL., supra note 19, at 125.
170. See Galiya I. Chanysheva, Oleksandr S. Yunin, Nadiia V. Miovska, Roman V.
Ponzhodzhuk & Viktoriia V. Mazur, Civil Liability of Police Officers in Ukraine and
Germany: Legal Aspects and Problematic Issues, 22 J. LEGAL, ETHICAL & REG. ISSUES 1,
3 (2019).
171. Id. at 4 (discussing how Article 23 of the Civil Code of Ukraine gives citizens the
right to seek compensation for moral damage inflicted by the police).
172. CIVIL CODE OF UKRAINE ART. 23, http://teplydim.com.ua/static/storage/filesfiles
/Civil%20Code_Eng.pdf.
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Further, in Ukraine, when injury from a police officer results in
bodily harm or death of a citizen, they must sue the State, and, if the
police officer is found liable, the officer is then liable to the State for
the relief obtained by the successful private litigants.173 Specifically,
if a private citizen believes that a police officer acted in an unjust
way with excessive use of force that caused bodily injury or death,
they will be compensated for said injury.174 Plaintiffs can obtain loss
of future or potential earnings when the victim is either physically
injured or killed.175 In order to prove that the officer was liable, the
private party must prove that damage occurred, the police officer was
acting unreasonably, a causation requirement, and overall fault of
the officer.176 The court, acting as a factfinder:
must determine whether the fact of causing non-pecuniary or
physical harm to the plaintiff is confirmed, under which circumstances or by which acts (omission) this harm has been inflicted, in what amount of money or in what material form does
the plaintiff evaluate the damage caused and what he (she) refers
to, as well as other circumstances relevant to the resolution of
the dispute.177

This solution seems workable, especially considering that there
is a discrete analysis the court would have to undertake.178 Furthermore, Israel would not have to worry about litigants receiving lump
sums because: (1) the pecuniary amount would be adjustable by the
court; and, (2) if plaintiffs are successful in these suits, the state
could attempt to recover their losses from the liable police officer in
a separate proceeding.179 But this second option may not be desirable
or practical in Israel depending on how much money the successful
plaintiffs obtain.180
Similarly, Germany has procedures that citizens can pursue
when there has been police misconduct.181 But, in Germany, if the
173. See Chanysheva et al., supra note 170, at 3 (explaining that Article 1176 of the
Civil Code is the basis for civil liability for police officers and Article 543 of the Civil
Code discusses an officer’s liability to the State).
174. See id. at 4.
175. Id. (discussing that Article 22 of the Civil Code of Ukraine provides for damages
in terms of loss of profit).
176. See id. at 5.
177. Id.
178. See id.
179. See Chanysheva et al., supra note 170, at 5.
180. See ERI Economic Research Institute, Inc., Police Officer Salary, SALARYEXPERT
(last updated Sept. 9, 2020), https://www.salaryexpert.com/salary/job/police-officer/israel
[https://perma.cc/DHJ6-RY5H] (noting that the average salary of an Israeli police officer
is 189,215 Israeli Shekels per year  $56,021 USD).
181. See Chanysheva et al., supra note 170, at 5–6.
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factfinder determines that the victim in the case of police misconduct contributed to the injury by way of negligence, the compensation will be decreased accordingly.182 Thus, there is the concern that
if Israel were to adopt a procedure similar to Germany, the awarded
compensation would be minimal because a common defense many
police officers use is fear for their life arising from the situation.183 Additionally, in situations similar to Damas Pakada, it is unlikely plaintiffs would find the German-style recourse particularly helpful.184
France, on the other hand, has a broader approach to civil
liability than Ukraine or Germany.185 Police officers can be liable if
the plaintiff is able to prove “1. Fault; 2. Damage; [and] 3. The causal
link between the fault and the damage caused.”186 French courts
consider both pecuniary and non-pecuniary damage and, when they
assess a damage award, will take care to consider the injured party’s
bodily harm, inability to maintain their previous lifestyle, and the
“existence of financial loss.”187 Particularly, France applies “the principle of full compensation for damage” where the ideal outcome is to
“compensate for the damage as much as possible.”188
This model is probably the most alluring to the Ethiopian Jews
in Israel, but it does come with its downsides. The French courts have
struggled to put a specific number to non-pecuniary damages, even
after the implementation of a “special compensation table” in 2005.189
The compensation table is not mandatory for French courts to utilize
and thus there is a wide discrepancy in damage awards.190 Considering how the Israeli courts dealt with the police officers in the cases
of Biagda and Teka, it is likely that, even if the French procedures
and remedies were adopted in part, the Israeli courts would be able
to find either negligence on the part of the plaintiffs or, if liability
is found, an insignificant monetary award.191 Realistically, there is
182. See id. at 6.
183. See, e.g., Breiner, supra note 91.
184. Cf. Chanysheva et al., supra note 170, at 6 (discussing that German courts usually
award a small amount of money in pain and suffering claims against a police officer);
Yahav, supra note 121.
185. See Skrypnuik Oleksandr, Kresina Iryna, Dorokhina Yuliia, Zolotarova Nataliia
& Petrenko Oksana, Civil Liability of Police Officers in France, 22 J. OF LEGAL, ETHICAL
AND REG. ISSUES 1, 3–4 (2019) (discussing that the French construction of tort and negligence is broad).
186. Id. at 4.
187. Id. at 5–6.
188. Id. at 6.
189. Id.
190. Id.
191. See Oleksandr et al., supra note 185, at 6–7; Peleg & Breiner, supra note 6;
Israeli Policeman Who Killed Black Teen Released on Bail, supra note 7.
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no single body of foreign procedure or remedies that would resolve
the problems faced by the Ethiopian Jews in the Israeli justice
system but rather a combination of solutions along with the other
solutions proposed in this Note.
C. Better Community Relations and Racial Sensitivity Training
As discussed in Section II.C, misapplications of the Suspect
Arrest Procedure has led to a disproportionate use of force against
Ethiopian Jews and Palestinians.192 If that is the case, there needs
to be a more concerted effort to understand why Ethiopian Jews are
victimized more than the Israeli Mizrahim. Part of the reason
Ethiopian Jews face higher mortality rates when dealing with the
police can be attributed to the way Israeli society views them.193 The
view of Ethiopian Jews as a violent group of people may persist in
police officers, who then become more trigger-happy and improperly
escalate the Suspect Arrest Procedure.194
Other countries have implemented solutions to resolve issues
similar to the ones currently plaguing Israel. In Germany, for example, the police force has to train for 130 weeks.195 That training
includes what is essentially cultural sensitivity training in a university setting.196 Furthermore, the police officers are educated on the
law in classes so that they understand both their discretion and
what rights a suspect maintains.197 This training seems to be working because police fired their sidearms at people less than 150 times
in a single year and the job of police officer is something that is in
high demand.198
There is also the option of policing reform in the hiring stage.199
It should be imperative for the Israeli Police, and by extension, the
Israeli State, to weed out candidates who hold racially hostile beliefs, either explicitly or implicitly, through personality profiles,
psychological profiling, intensive interview questions, et cetera.200
192. See supra Section II.C.
193. See Abu et al., supra note 63, at 692; LAMONT ET AL., supra note 19, at 231 (noting
that Israeli society views Ethiopian Jews as both culturally backward and violent).
194. See Abu et al., supra note 63, at 692.
195. Sara Miller Llana, In Many Countries, Police Rarely Use Their Guns. Here’s Why,
TAKEPART (June 29, 2015), http://www.takepart.com/article/2015/06/29/many-countries
-police-rarely-use-their-guns-heres-why [https://perma.cc/G4WW-F32U].
196. Id. (explaining that police officers “learn[ed] about the cultural customs of
Muslims” to ameliorate any preconceived misconceptions of the police officers).
197. See id.
198. See id.
199. See André Douglas Pond Cummings, Reforming Police, 10 DREXEL L. REV. 573,
604–05 (2018).
200. See id.

2021]

BLACK LIVES MATTER ABROAD, TOO

537

Moreover, if there were a heightened standard for application, such
as higher educational attainment, it could lead to fewer instances
of unarmed Ethiopian Jews being killed by the State.201
Another option is the idea of “community policing.”202 This has
been implemented broadly in Japan where the doors to police stations
are transparent so that pedestrians can see everything happening
from the street and the police officers can be more accessible.203
Even in the United States, where there is an issue of excessive force
in the policing of marginalized communities—particularly Black
communities—there have been calls to cull police use of force
through community policing.204 In particular, there are calls for
police departments to diversify their workforces and seek out applicants who resemble the communities that they police.205 According
to the United States Department of Justice and the Equal Employment Opportunity Commission, the push for diversified law enforcement definitively “deepens trust in law enforcement, instills public
confidence in government, and supports the integrity of democracy.”206
Officers of color in the United States can and do “help bridge the
gap” between White officers and members of marginalized groups.207
This method could be particularly effective in Israel since the police
officers involved in the cases of Pakada, Biagda, and Teka were all
part of the Israeli Mizrahim.208 Israel could attempt to adopt a more
community-friendly approach and have officers patrol the areas that
are heavily Ethiopian and that could solve issues of over- and
under-policing.209
One of the most successful applications of community policing
that could be exported to Israel is the success seen by the Cincinnati
Police Department from 2008 onwards.210 The success of this form
of community policing is mainly attributed to the police focusing on
201. See id. at 605 (explaining that the mindsets of former military members are
“inclined toward a ‘warrior’ and ‘siege’ mentality” that leads to escalation, instead of deescalation of tensions).
202. Llana, supra note 195.
203. Id.
204. See Cynthia Lee, “But I Thought He Had A Gun,” Race and Police Use of Deadly
Force, 2 HASTINGS RACE & POVERTY L.J. 1, 42–43 (2004).
205. See id. at 34.
206. See U.S. DEP’T OF JUST. & U.S. EQUAL EMP. OPPORTUNITY COMM’N, ADVANCING
DIVERSITY IN LAW ENFORCEMENT (2016), https://www.eeoc.gov/eeoc/interagency/police-di
versity-report.cfm [https://perma.cc/NYJ7-WEBJ].
207. See Lee, supra note 204, at 34.
208. See TOI Staff, supra note 2; Peleg & Breiner, supra note 6; Shpigel et al., supra
note 6.
209. See supra Section II.B.
210. See Cummings, supra note 199, at 597–99 (noting that the city reduced citizen
injuries in police encounters by 56% over a period of fifteen years).
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solving the systemic issues behind why crimes are being committed
in the first place.211 Because the main issues the Ethiopian Jews
suffer are because of their socioeconomic status, it may be appropriate for the Israeli police—and legislature—to address those issues
instead of excessively policing the community.212 All of this being
said, there are many different definitions of “community policing”
and the options discussed here do not amount to the vast definition
the phrase carries.213
D. Defunding the Police
The killings of George Floyd and Breonna Taylor have led to
renewed calls to abolish the police in the United States.214 Like community policing, defunding the police has many definitions and
looks different depending on who is asked.215 Many say this does not
mean getting rid of the police entirely, but rather reallocating funds
from police departments to other social services.216 The social services
that benefit from additional funds would be able to reinvest into the
Black communities that “have been deeply divested from.”217 Through
services like “job training, counseling, . . . violence-prevention[,]”
and more, defunding the police would address issues that cause individuals to commit crime, thus attacking the issue policing seeks to
address at its source before it happens.218
Some calling for defunding the police have said that divestiture
would merely be the first step.219 The final goal would be a “model
of community-led public safety.”220 Regardless of the form it takes,
proponents of defunding the police, especially in the United States,
say it is necessary because police—who are meant to protect all
211. See id. at 599–600 (explaining that the police department listened to the concerns
of members of the community and collaborated “with local businesses” among other
community groups).
212. See supra Section I.C; cf. Cummings, supra note 199, at 599–600.
213. See Lee, supra note 204, at 42–43.
214. See, e.g., Scottie Andrew, There’s a growing call to defund the police. Here’s what
it means, CNN (June 17, 2020), https://www.cnn.com/2020/06/06/us/what-is-defund-po
lice-trnd/index.html [https://perma.cc/BT9Y-PG7Y].
215. See id.; see also supra Section III.C.
216. See Andrew, supra note 214 (noting that the social services that would obtain
funds divested from police departments include, but are not limited to, schools, hospitals,
mental health, domestic violence, homelessness, and housing and food).
217. Id.
218. See Paige Fernandez, Defunding the Police Will Actually Make Us Safer, ACLU
(June 11, 2020), https://www.aclu.org/news/criminal-law-reform/defunding-the-police
-will-actually-make-us-safer [https://perma.cc/4ZUQ-7AQ9].
219. See Andrew, supra note 214.
220. Id.
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communities—disproportionately use excessive and lethal force
against Black people.221 As the call for defunding the police is gaining traction in the United States,222 how realistic is the implementation of divestiture from the police into social services in Israel?
Sadly, it does not seem realistic as of now. In November 2018,
the Israeli cabinet approved spending cuts worth $5.9 billion over
a seventeen-year time span.223 These pay cuts were implemented “to
help finance a steep salary increase for policemen . . . as well as
supplements to pensioners.”224 This budget cut will divest funds
from shelters to help at-risk women, hurt the agricultural industry
and inevitably creating higher unemployment, and being “a mortal
blow for education, welfare, public security and health.”225 Because
this divestment of funds would flow from social services and to the
police department, it seems like the Israeli government is doing the
opposite of defunding the police.226 This divestment does not address
social problems at their root, but rather perpetuates social harms.227
CONCLUSION
Ethiopian Jews are unique as a group that has historically been
both over-policed and under-policed.228 They returned to a land that
they call home, but now many are homeless.229 Their children are
being beaten and shot by the state with little or no repercussions for
the perpetrators.230 Sadly, these issues are being exported out of
Israel.231
221. See id.
222. See Stef W. Kight & Kim Hart, The cities that are already defunding the police,
AXIOS (June 27, 2020), https://www.axios.com/cities-defund-the-police-george-floyd-188e
169a-a32a-44fa-bace-e2e5df4d1c9b.html [https://perma.cc/DLC5-FH55] (noting that
Baltimore approved a $22.4 million budget cut for the police department, Portland cut
$15 million from its police department, and other cities are allocating smaller amounts
of the police budgets towards social works).
223. See Emelia Sithole-Matarise, Israel to slash spending through 2035 to fund police
salary hike, REUTERS (Nov. 18, 2018), https://www.reuters.com/article/israel-budget/is
rael-to-slash-spending-through-2035-to-fund-police-salary-hike-idUSL8N1XT0KY
[https://perma.cc/WM73-RQ4K].
224. Id.
225. TOI Staff, After bitter debate, cabinet approves budget cut to raise cops’ salaries,
TIMES OF ISR. (Nov. 18, 2018), https://www.timesofisrael.com/after-bitter-debate-cabinet
-approves-budget-cut-to-raise-cops-salaries/ [https://perma.cc/BVQ9-KN24] (internal quotation marks omitted).
226. See id.
227. See Fernandez, supra note 218.
228. See supra Section II.B.
229. See Chehata, supra note 30, at 2–3.
230. See, e.g., Shpigel et al., supra note 6.
231. See Edith Garwood, With Whom Are Many U.S. Police Departments Training?
With a Chronic Human Rights Violator—Israel, AMNESTY INT’L (Aug. 25, 2016), https://
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With the United States and Israel being so closely linked and
each country exporting policing tactics that lead to deaths of young
Black men like Freddie Gray and Solomon Teka,232 it is imperative
that each country addresses this plague of shootings of unarmed
Black people by police officers. There is simply no excuse for this
epidemic to continue without redress. Both nations need to take
active, cognizable steps in both legal and policy reform to solve this
crisis. “Until both nations make serious efforts to improve their
policing practices, more [Black] civilians will die.”233
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